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REcENT DEcisioNs
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INSURANCE DISABILITY BENEFITS - INsURED's Durr To REMOVE
DISABILITY - Plaintiff insured had suffered from diabetes since 1932. Defendant insurance company paid disability benefits till 1937 and thereafter refused to make further payments on the ground that plaintiff had refused to
avail himself of the insulin and dietary treatment advised by his physician. Such
treatment is neither dangerous, painful, nor detrimental to the patient. From an
order sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's answer, defendant appealed.
Held, plaintiff's demurrer sustained. The policies as written define the rights
and duties of the contracting parties and should be construed as written. The
court will not read into policies by operation of law a condition precedent to
liability when the insurer who drafted the contract did not expressly incorporate
such a provision. The doctrine of "avoidable consequences" does not apply in
disability cases. Miller v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 206 Minn. 221, 289
N. W. 399 (1939).
There is a split of authority on the question whether submission to medical
treatment is a condition precedent to recovery of total disability benefits, with
the majority of the courts holding that submission to medical treatment is a
necessary condition precedent. The rationale by which the courts arrive at this
result varies. Some courts adopt, by analogy, the doctrine of "avoidable consequences," 1 _which is extensively employed in the field of contracts,2 torts,8 and

1 The essence of the doctrine of avoidable consequences is that one cannot recover
for such consequences of the wrong or negligence of another as might, with ordinary
prudence, have been avoided. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES, § 34 (1935).
2 \Vavra v. Karr, 142 Minn. 248, 172 N. W. II8 (1919); McCoRMICK, DAMAGES, § 34 (1935).
3 See 14 MINN. L. REv. 294 (1930), which reviews the cases in which the refusal
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workmen's compensation acts.4 Estoppel has also been suggested as a basis £or
denying insured recovery of disability benefits when he refuses to submit to
medical treatment.:' Another theory used to substantiate the majority rule proceeds somewhat in this manner: the policy provides for benefits upon total and
permanent disability; the word "permanent" is synonomous with the word
"incurable," and since the insured can cure his disability through medical attention he is not permanently disabled. 6 A few courts have even suggested
"proximate cause" as a basis for decision, i.e., failure to submit to treatment is
the ~roximate cause of the disability.7 The operation of the majority rule is,
however, limited in its scope by considerations regarcling the nature of the medical treatment to which the insured would have to submit in order to attempt
to cure his disabilities. A rough line is usually drawn between treatment of a
serious and hazardous nature and treatment which is simple and certain, with
the courts holding that in the former case submission to treatment is not a
condition precedent to recovery of disability benefits. Considerations which may
influence the courts in deciding where to draw this line are the cost and con,.
venience of treatment, the certainty_ of the cure, and the dangers of the treatment.8 One court has said that hope of a partial cure is sufficient to require
of a plaintiff in a personal injury action to submit to prescribed medical treatment
may be considered by the jury in mitigation of his damages.
4 Decisions under the workmen's compensation acts have generally held that an
injured employee cannot claim further compensation if he refuses to submit to a
relatively simple operation that is fairly certain to be successful. Gentry v. Williams
Bros., 135 Kan. 408, 10 P. (2d) 856 (1932) (hernia); Lesh v. Illinois Steel Co., 163
Wis. 124, 157 N. W. 539 (1916) (removal of nodule on leg); Kobas v. American
Boston Mining Co., 275 Mich. 616, 267 N. W. 751 (1936) (amputation of finger
tips).
For insurance cases carrying the doctrine of avoidable consequences over into
the disability field, see: Cody v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., I l l W. Va. 518,
163 S. E. 4, 86 A. L. R. 354 at 360 (1932) (infected teeth and tonsils); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Chew, (Ark. 1909) 122 S. W. 643 (paralysis of arm and hand);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Davis, 18 Tenn. App. 413, 78 S. W. (2d) 358 (1934) (removal
of bone impeding leg movement).
5 Cody v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., III W. Va. 518, 163 S. E.
4 (193z); Perkins v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, (Mo. App. 1934) 73 S. W.
(2d) 415. Note the anomalous nature of this estoppel as compared with the elements
usually necessary to constitute an estoppel in insurance cases. See VANCE, INSURANCE,
zd ed., 514 (1930).
6 United States v. Clapp, (C. C. A. zd, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 793 (digestive disorders); Prevette v. United States, (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 68 F. (zd) n2; Deakter
v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., (D. C. Pa. 1935) 12 F. Supp. 182 (hernia); Equitable Life
Ins. Co. v. Singletary, (C. C. A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 409 (injured lmee).
7 Eggen v. United States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 616 (tuberculosis);
Puckett v. United States, (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) 70 F. (2d) 895 (tuberculosis); Smith
v. United States, (D. C. Ky. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 475 (tuberculosis).
8 These £our considerations are found clearly set forth in the tort cases but not
so clearly in the insurance cases. Some courts simply rely on the "reasonably prudent
man concept," i.e., insured must submit to treatment to which a reasonably prudent
man would yield. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 192 Ark. 590, 93 S, W. (2d) 141
(1936); Culver v. Prudential Ins. Co., 36 Del. 582, 179 A. 400 (1935).
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submission to treatment.0 Others have held that cost and danger are irrelevant.10
Under the minority view the courts reject the doctrine of avoidance of consequences and by a strict contractual approach deny that insured must submit to
medical treatment as a condition precedent to recovery of disability benefits.11
The typical approach in these decisions is that omission of a provision m the
insurance contract requiring submission to medical treatment means no treatment
is necessary. Or the court may say that such a condition precedent was not
within the contemplation of the parties.12
Roy L. Steinheimer

Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 173 S. C. 213, 175 S. E. 425 (1934).
Prudential Ins. Co., 15 N. J. Misc. 242, 190 A. 325 (1937);
Boughton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 183 La. 908, 165 So. 140 (1934).
11 Roderick v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 231 Mo. App. 852, 98 S. W. (2d)
983 (1936); Tittsworth v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co., 6 Tenn. App. 206 (1927);
Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Hurt, 254 Ky. 603, 72 S. W. (2d) 20 (1934); Shane v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 22 Tenn. App. 85, II8 S. W. (2d) 570 (1939).
12 The principal case is also noted in 88 UNJv. PA. L. REV. 749 (1940).
9

1

°Kordulak v.

